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Abstract
Designing routing schemes is a multidimensional and complex task that depends
on the objective function, the computational model (centralized vs. distributed),
and the amount of uncertainty (online vs. offline). Nevertheless, there are quite
a few well-studied general techniques, for a large variety of network problems. In
contrast, in our view, practical techniques for designing robust routing schemes are
scarce; while fault-tolerance has been studied from a number of angles, existing
approaches are concerned with dealing with faults after the fact by rerouting, self-
healing, or similar techniques. We argue that this comes at a high burden for the
designer, as in such a system any algorithm must account for the effects of faults
on communication.
With the goal of initiating efforts towards addressing this issue, we showcase
simple and generic transformations that can be used as a blackbox to increase re-
silience against (independently distributed) faults. Given a network and a routing
scheme, we determine a reinforced network and corresponding routing scheme that
faithfully preserves the specification and behavior of the original scheme. We show
that reasonably small constant overheads in terms of size of the new network com-
pared to the old are sufficient for substantially relaxing the reliability requirements
on individual components. The main message in this paper is that the task of
designing a robust routing scheme can be decoupled into (i) designing a routing
scheme that meets the specification in a fault-free environment, (ii) ensuring that
nodes correspond to fault-containment regions, i.e., fail (approximately) indepen-
dently, and (iii) applying our transformation to obtain a reinforced network and a
robust routing scheme that is fault-tolerant.
Keywords. Fault-tolerant, reinforcements, networks, routing schemes, grids, minor-
free graphs.
1 Introduction
When scaling up the size of systems, one inevitably faces the challenge of sufficiently
enhancing reliability to ensure intended operation. Specifically, this applies to the com-
munication infrastructure, which must remain operational despite failures of some com-
ponents. Otherwise, isolated faults would bring down the entire system, which is im-
practical unless the failure probability of individual components is so small that it is
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likely that none of them fail. Existing designs and algorithms (that are considered prac-
tical) do account for lost messages and, in some cases, permanently crash-failing nodes
or edges [CLM12, KKD10, PNK+06].
It is our understanding that handling stronger fault types is considered practically
infeasible, be it in terms of complexity of implementations or the involved overheads.
However, pretending that crash failures are the worst that can happen means that the
entire system possibly fails whenever, e.g., we face a “babbling idiot” (i.e., a node er-
roneously generating many messages and congesting the network), excessive link delays
(violating specification), or misrouting, corruption, or loss of messages. The current ap-
proach is to (i) use techniques like error correction, acknowledging reception, etc. to mask
the effects of such faults, (ii) hope to detect and deactivate faulty components quickly
(logically mapping faults to crashes), and (iii) repair or replace the faulty components
after they have been taken offline. This strategy may result in significant disruption of
applications; possible consequences include:
(I) Severe delays in execution, as successful message delivery necessitates to detect
and deactivate faulty components first. (II) Failure to deliver correct messages and the
resulting repeated attempts to do so (both by applications or routing algorithms) overload
the network; the resulting congestion then renders the system inoperative as a whole.
(III) Constraints on message delivery times are violated, breaking any real-time service.
(IV) More generally, any instance of the classic fallacy of assuming that the network is
reliable [RGO] may cause secondary errors.
In this paper, we challenge the belief that resilience to strong fault types is intractable
in practice. We discuss generic approaches to reinforcing networks at small constant over-
heads (in terms of resources like nodes, links, latency, and energy) to achieve resilience to
non-crash faults (up to fully Byzantine, i.e., arbitrary behavior). The proposed strategies
are deliberately extremely simple, both in terms of applying them and analyzing them.
Yet, they substantially reduce the required reliability on the component level to main-
tain network functionality, without losing messages or increasing latencies. We provide
transformations that allow for directly reusing non-fault-tolerant routing schemes as a
blackbox, avoiding the need to refactor working solutions. The main message we seek
to convey is that being prepared for non-benign faults can be simple, affordable, and
practical, and therefore enables building larger reliable networks.
The Challenge. The task we set out for ourselves is the following. We are given a
synchronous network G = (V,E) and a routing scheme. We seek to allocate additional
resources (nodes, edges) to the network and provide a corresponding routing strategy to
simulate the routing scheme on the original network despite non-benign node failures. The
goals are to (i) use little additional resources, (ii) maximize the probability of uniformly
independently random node failures the network is likely to withstand, (iii) ensure that
the transformation is simple to implement, and (iv) interferes as little as possible with
the existing system design and operation, e.g., does not change the reinforced system’s
specification. Note that both (iii) and (iv) are crucial for practical utility; significant
refactoring of existing systems and/or accommodating substantial design constraints is
rarely affordable.
This setting makes a number of simplifying assumptions. First and probably most
notably, we assume independent failures. This is motivated by the fact that highly
correlated faults necessitate high degrees of redundancy and thus overheads; clearly, a
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system-wide power outage, whether rare or not, cannot be addressed by adding extra
nodes or edges that are connected to the same power source, but requires independent
backup power. More generally, guaranteeing full functionality despite having f adver-
sarially placed faults trivially requires node degrees larger than f . As there are many
reasons why topologies of communication networks feature very small degrees in prac-
tice, assuming worst-case distribution of faults would hence come at too high of a cost.
Instead, we aim at masking faults with little or no correlation among each other, arguing
that resilience to such faults can be boosted significantly. Second, in this context we treat
nodes and their outgoing links as fault-containment regions (according to [Kop03]), i.e.,
they are the basic components our systems are comprised of. This choice is made for
the sake of concreteness; similar results could be obtained when considering, e.g., edge
failures, without changing the gist of results or techniques. With these considerations in
mind, the probability of uniformly random node failures that the reinforced system can
tolerate is a canonical choice for measuring resilience. Third, we focus on synchronous
networks. This has several reasons: we believe synchrony helps in handling faults, both
on the theoretical level (as illustrated by the famous FLP theorem [FLP85]) and for en-
suring correct implementation; it simplifies presentation, making it easier to focus on the
proposed concepts; last but not least, we believe our approach to be of particular interest
in the context of real-time systems, where the requirement of meeting hard deadlines
makes synchrony an especially attractive choice.
Techniques and Results. Our first approach is almost trivial: We replace each
node by ` ∈ N copies and for each edge we connect each pair of copies of its endpoints,
where ` is a constant.1 Whenever a message would be sent over an edge in the original
graph, it should be sent over each copy of the edge in the reinforced graph. If not too
many copies of a given node fail, this enables each receiving copy to recover the correct
message. Thus, each non-faulty copy of a node can run the routing algorithm as if it
were the original node, guaranteeing that it has the same view of the system state as its
original in the corresponding fault-free execution of the routing scheme on the original
graph.
We observe that, asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s., with probability 1− o(1)) and
with ` = 2f+1, this reinforcement can sustain an independent probability p of Byzantine
node failures for any p ∈ o(n−1/(f+1)). This threshold is sharp up to (small) constant
factors: for p ∈ ω(n−1/(f+1)), a.a.s. there is some node for which all of its copies fail. If we
restrict the fault model to omission faults (faulty nodes may skip sending some messages),
` = f + 1 suffices. The cost of this reinforcement is that the number of nodes and edges
increase by factors of ` and `2, respectively. Therefore, already this simplistic solution can
support non-crash faults of probability p ∈ o(1/√n) at a factor-4 overhead. Note that the
simulation introduces no big computational overhead and does not change the way the
system works, enabling to use it as a blackbox. Randomized algorithms can be simulated
as well, provided that all copies of a node have access to a shared source of randomness;
note that this requirement is much weaker than globally shared randomness: it makes
sense to place the copies of a node in physical proximity to approximately preserve the
geometrical layout of the physical realization of the network topology.
We then proceed to reducing the involved overhead further. To this end, we apply the
1Choosing concreteness over generality, we focus on the, in our view, most interesting case of constant
`. It is straightforward to generalize the analysis.
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above strategy only to a small subset E ′ of the edge set. Denoting by v1, . . . , v` the copies
of node v ∈ V , for any remaining edge {v, w} ∈ E we add only edges {vi, wi}, i ∈ [`], to the
reinforced graph. The idea is to choose E ′ in a way such that the connected components
induced by E\E ′ are of constant size. This results in the same asymptotic threshold for p,
while the number of edges of the reinforced graph drops to ((1−ε)`+ε`2)|E|. For constant
ε, we give constructions with this property for grids or tori of constant dimension and
minor-free graphs of bounded degree. Again, we consider the case of f = 1 of particular
interest: in many typical network topologies, we can reinforce the network to boost the
failure probability that can be tolerated from Θ(1/n) to Ω(1/
√
n) by roughly doubling
(omission faults) or tripling (Byzantine faults) the number of nodes and edges.
The redundancy in this second construction is near-optimal under the constraint that
we want to simulate arbitrary routing scheme in a blackbox fashion, as it entails that we
need a surviving copy of each edge, and thus in particular each node. While one may argue
that the paid price is steep, in many cases it will be smaller than the price for making each
individual component sufficiently reliable to avoid this overhead. Furthermore, we briefly
argue that the simplicity of our constructions enables us to re-purpose the redundant
resources in applications with less strict reliability requirements.
We wrap up our presentation by suggesting some open problems which we consider
of interest for further developing the proposed paradigm of reinforcement against non-
benign faults.
Related work. Local Byzantine faults were studied in [DH08, PP05] in the context
of broadcast and consensus problems. Unlike its global classical counterpart, the f -local
Byzantine adversary can control at most f neighbors of each vertex. This more restricted
adversary gives rise to more scalable solutions, as the problems can be solved in networks
of degree O(f); without this restriction, degrees need to be proportional to the total
number of faults in the network.
We also limit our adversary in its selection of Byzantine nodes, by requiring that the
faulty nodes are chosen independently at random. As illustrated, e.g., by Lemma 1 and
Theorem 2, there is a close connection between the two settings. Informally, we show
what certain values of p correspond, asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s), to an f -local
Byzantine adversary. However, we diverge from the approach in [DH08, PP05] in that
we require a fully time-preserving simulation of a fault-free routing schedule, as opposed
to solving the routing task in the reinforced network from scratch.
There is large variety of other approaches to fault-tolerant routing, which is funda-
mentally different in terms of requirements and solutions; we discuss these in Appendix A.
2 High-level Overview
In this section, we highlight the utility of decoupling the task of designing a valid rein-
forcement from the task of designing a routing scheme over the input network: one can
just plug in any routing scheme, for any objective, e.g., load minimization, maximizing
the throughput, etc., in various models of computation, e.g., centralized or distributed,
randomized or deterministic, online or offline, or oblivious. We now sketch the guar-
antees and (mild) preconditions of our blackbox transformation informally (for formal
specification see Sections 3).
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Assumptions on the Input Network. We have two main assumptions on the
network at hand: (1) We consider synchronous routing networks, and (2) each node
in the network (alongside its outgoing links) is a fault-containment region, i.e., it fails
independently from other nodes.
Valid Reinforcement Simulation Guarantees. Our reinforcements make a num-
ber of copies of each node. We have each non-faulty copy of a node run the routing algo-
rithm as if it were the original node, guaranteeing that it has the same view of the system
state as its original in the corresponding fault-free execution of the routing scheme on the
original graph. Moreover, the simulation fully preserves all guarantees of the schedule,
including its timing, and introduces no big computational overhead.
Unaffected Complexity and Cost Measures. When designing a routing scheme,
one optimizes its complexity, e.g., in terms of running time for centralized algorithms,
number of rounds for distributed algorithms, message size, etc. This is balanced against
its quality with respect to the objective function of the problem at hand, e.g., load min-
imization, maximizing the throughput, minimizing the latency, etc. Moreover, there is
the degree of uncertainty that can be sustained, e.g., whether the input to the algorithm
is fully available at the beginning of the computation (offline computation) or revealed
over time (online computation). Our reinforcements preserve all of these properties, as
they operate in a blackbox fashion. For example, our machinery readily yields various
fault-tolerant packet routing algorithms in the Synchronous Store-and-Forward model by
Aiello et. al [AKOR03]. More specifically, from [EMP15] we obtain a centralized deter-
ministic online algorithms on unidirectional grids of constant dimension that achieves a
competitive ratio which is polylogarithmic in the number of nodes of the input network
w.r.t. throughput maximization. Using [EMR16] instead, we get a centralized random-
ized offline algorithm on the unidirectional line with constant approximation ratio w.r.t.
throughput maximization. In the case that deadlines need to be met the approximation
ratio is, roughly, O(log∗ n) [RR11]. As a final example, one can obtain from [AKK09]
various online distributed algorithms with sublinear competitive ratios w.r.t. throughput
maximization.
Cost and Gains of the Reinforcement. The price of adding fault-tolerance is
given by the increase in the network size, i.e., the number of nodes and edges of the
reinforced network in comparison to the original one. Due to the assumed independence
of node failures, it is straightforward to see that the (uniform) probability of sustainable
node faults increases roughly like n−1/(f+1) in return for (i) a linear-in-f increase in the
number of nodes and (ii) an increase in the number of edges that is quadratic in f . We
then proceed to improve the construction for grids and minor-free constant-degree graphs
to reduce the increase in the number of edges to linear in f . Based on this information,
one can then assess the effort in terms of these additional resources that is beneficial, as
less reliable nodes in turn are cheaper to build, maintain, and operate. We also note that,
due to the ability of the reinforced network to ensure ongoing unrestricted operability
in the presence of some faulty nodes, faulty nodes can be replaced or repaired before
communication is impaired or breaks down.
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Preprocessing. Preprocessing is used, e.g., in computing routing tables in Oblivi-
ous Routing [Ra¨c09]. The reinforcement simply uses the output of such a preprocessing
stage in the same manner as the original algorithm. In other words, the preprocessing
is done on the input network and its output determines the input routing scheme. In
particular, the preprocessing may be randomized and does not need to be modified in
any way.
Randomization. Randomized routing algorithms can be simulated as well, pro-
vided that all copies of a node have access to a shared source of randomness. We remark
that, as our scheme locally duplicates the network topology, it is natural to preserve the
physical realization of the network topology in the sense that all (non-faulty) copies of a
node are placed in physical proximity. This implies that this constraint is much easier to
satisfy than globally shared randomness.
3 Preliminaries
We consider synchronous routing networks. Formally, the network is modeled as a di-
rected graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of n , |V | vertices, and E is the set of
m , |E| edges (or links). Each node maintains a state, based on which it decides in each
round for each of its outgoing links which message to transmit. We are not concerned
with the inner workings of the node, i.e., how the state is updated; rather, we assume
that we are given a scheduling algorithm performing the task of updating this state and
use it in our blackbox transformations. In particular, we allow for online, distributed,
and randomized algorithms.
Probability-p Byzantine Faults Byz(p). The set of faulty nodes F ⊆ V is de-
termined by sampling each v ∈ V into F with independent probability p. Nodes in F
may deviate from the protocol in arbitrary ways, including delaying, dropping, or forging
messages, etc.
Probability-p Omission Faults Om(p). The set of faulty nodes F ⊆ V is deter-
mined by sampling each v ∈ V into F with independent probability p. Nodes in F may
deviate from the protocol by not sending a message over an outgoing link when they
should. We note that it is sufficient for this fault model to be satisfied logically. That
is, as long as a correct node can identify incorrect messages, it may simply drop them,
resulting in the same behavior of the system at all correct nodes as if the message was
never sent.
Simulations and Reinforcement. For a given network G = (V,E) and a schedul-
ing algorithm A, we will seek to reinforce (G,A) by constructing G′ = (V ′, E ′) and
scheduling algorithm A′ such that the original algorithm A is simulated by A′ on G′,
where G′ is subject to random node failures. We now formalize these notions. First, we
require that there is a projection (i.e., surjective mapping) P : V ′ → V ; fix G′ and P ,
and choose F ′ ⊆ V ′ randomly as specified above.
Definition 1 (Simulation under Byz(p)). Assume that in each round r ∈ N, each v′ ∈
V ′ \ F ′ is given the same input by the environment as P (v′). A′ is a simulation of A
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under Byz(p), if for each v ∈ V , a strict majority of the nodes v′ ∈ V ′ with P (v′) = v
computes in each round r ∈ N the state of v in A in this round. The simulation is strong,
if not only for each v ∈ V there is a strict majority doing so, but all v′ ∈ V ′ \F ′ compute
the state of P (v′) in each round.
Definition 2 (Simulation under Om(p)). Assume that in each round r ∈ N, each v′ ∈ V ′
is given the same input by the environment as P (v′). A′ is a simulation of A under
Om(p), if for each v ∈ V , there is v′ ∈ V ′ with P (v′) = v that computes in each round
r ∈ N the state of v in A in this round. The simulation is strong, if each v′ ∈ V ′ computes
the state of P (v′) in each round.
Definition 3 (Reinforcement). A (strong) reinforcement of a graph G = (V,E) is a graph
G′ = (V ′, E ′), a projection P : V ′ → V , and a way of determining a scheduling algorithm
A′ for G′ out of scheduling algorithm A for G. The reinforcement is valid under the given
fault model (Byz(p) or Om(p)) if A′ is a (strong) simulation of A a.a.s.
Resources and Performance Measures. We use the following performance mea-
sures. (i) The probability p of independent node failures that can be sustained a.a.s.
(ii) The ratio ν , |V ′|/|V |, i.e., the relative increase in the number of nodes. (iii) The
ratio η , |E ′|/|E|, i.e., the relative increase in the number of edges. In Appendix B we
briefly discuss, from a practical point of view, why we do not explicitly consider further
metrics that are of interest.
4 Strong Reinforcement under Byz(p)
Given are the input network G = (V,E) and scheduling algorithm A. Fix a parameter
f ∈ N and set ` = 2f + 1.
Reinforced Network G′. We set V ′ , V × [`], where [`] , {1, . . . , `}, and denote
vi , (v, i). Accordingly, P (vi) , v. We define E ′ , {(v′, w′) ∈ V ′ × V ′ | (P (v′), P (w′)) ∈
E}.
Strong Simulation A′ of A. Consider node v′ ∈ V ′ \F ′. We want to maintain the
invariant that in each round, each such node has a copy of the state of v = P (v′) in A.
To this end, v′
(1) initializes local copies of all state variables of v as in A,
(2) sends on each link (v′, w′) ∈ E ′ in each round the message v would send on
(P (v′), P (w′)) when executing A, and
(3) for each neighbor w of P (v′) and each round r, updates the local copy of the state
of A as if v received the message that has been sent to v′ by at least f + 1 of the
nodes w′ with P (w′) = w (each one using edge (w′, v′)).
Naturally, the last step requires such a majority to exist; otherwise, the simulation fails.
We show that A′ can be executed and simulates A provided that for each v ∈ V , no more
than f of its copies are in F ′.
Lemma 1. Suppose that for each v ∈ V , |{vi ∈ F ′}| ≤ f . Then A′ strongly simulates A.
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Proof. We show the claim by induction on the round number r ∈ N, where we consider
the initialization to anchor the induction at r = 0. For the step from r to r + 1, observe
that because all v′ ∈ V ′ \F ′ have a copy of the state of P (v′) at the end of round r by the
induction hypothesis, each of them can correctly determine the message P (v′) would send
over link (v, w) ∈ E in round r + 1 and send it over each (v′, w′) ∈ E with P (w′) = w.
Accordingly, each v′ ∈ V ′ \ F ′ receives the message A would send over (w, v) ∈ E from
each w′ ∈ V ′\F ′ with P (w′) = w (via the link (w′, v′)). By the assumption of the lemma,
we have at least `− f = f + 1 such nodes, implying that v′ updates the local copy of the
state of A as if it received the same messages as when executing A in round r+ 1. Thus,
the induction step succeeds and the proof is complete.
Resilience of the Reinforcement. We now examine how large the probability p
can be for the precondition of Lemma 1 to be satisfied a.a.s.
Theorem 2. Assume that p ∈ o(1). Then the above construction is a valid strong
reinforcement for the fault model Byz(p) if p ∈ o(n−1/(f+1)). Moreover, if G contains
Ω(n) nodes with non-zero outdegree, p ∈ ω(n−1/(f+1)) implies that the reinforcement is
not valid.
Proof. By Lemma 1, A′ strongly simulates A if for each v ∈ V , |{vi ∈ F ′}| ≤ f . If
p ∈ o(n−1/(f+1)) ∩ o(1), using ` = 2f + 1 and a union bound we see that the probability
of this event is at most
1− n
2f+1∑
j=f+1
(
2f + 1
j
)
pj(1− p)2f+1−j ≥ 1− n
2f+1∑
j=f+1
(
2f + 1
j
)
pj
≥ 1− n
(
2f + 1
f + 1
)
pf+1
f∑
j=0
pj ∈ 1− n(2e)fpf+1(1 + o(1)) = 1− o(1).
Here, the second last step uses that
(
a
b
) ≤ (ae/b)b and that p ∈ o(1), while the last step
exploits that p ∈ o(n−1/(f+1)).
On the other hand, for any v ∈ V , the probability that |{vi ∈ F ′}| > f is independent
of the same event for other nodes and larger than
(
2f+1
f+1
)
pf+1 ≥ (3/2)fpf+1, since (a
b
) ≥
(a/b)b. Hence, if G contains Ω(n) nodes v with non-zero outdegree, p ∈ ω(n−1/(f+1)) ∩
o(1) implies that the probability that there is some node v with |{vi ∈ F ′}| > f is in
1−
(
1− (3
2
)f
pf+1
)Ω(n)
⊆ 1−(1− ω ( 1
n
) ∩ o(1))Ω(n) = 1−o(1). If there is such a node v,
there are algorithms A and inputs so that A sends a message across some edge (v, w) in
some round. If faulty nodes do not send messages in this round, the nodes wi ∈ V ′ \ F ′
do not receive the correct message from more than f nodes vi and the simulation fails.
Hence, the reinforcement cannot be valid.
We remark that for constant p, one can determine suitable values of f ∈ Θ(log n)
using Chernoff’s bound. However, as our focus is on small (constant) overhead factors,
we refrain from presenting the calculation here.
Efficiency of the Reinforcement. For f ∈ N, we have that ν = ` = 2f + 1 and
η = `2 = 4f 2 + 4f + 1, while we can sustain p ∈ o(n−1/(f+1)). In the special case of
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f = 1, we improve from p ∈ o(1/n) for the original network to p ∈ o(1/√n) by tripling
the number of nodes. However, η = 9, i.e., while the number of edges also increases only
by a constant, it seems too large in systems where the limiting factor is the amount of
links that can be afforded.
5 Strong Reinforcement under Om(p)
The strong reinforcement from the previous section is, trivially, also a strong reinforce-
ment under Om(p). However, we can reduce the number of copies per node for the weaker
fault model. Given are the input network G = (V,E) and scheduling algorithm A. Fix a
parameter f ∈ N and, this time, set ` = f + 1.
Reinforced Network G′. We set V ′ , V × [`] and denote vi , (v, i). Accordingly,
P (vi) , v. We define E ′ , {(v′, w′) ∈ V ′ × V ′ | (P (v′), P (w′)) ∈ E}.
Strong Simulation A′ of A. Each node2 v′ ∈ V ′
(1) initializes local copies of all state variables of v as in A,
(2) sends on each link (v′, w′) ∈ E ′ in each round the message v would send on
(P (v′), P (w′)) when executing A, and
(3) for each neighbor w of P (v′) and each round r, updates the local copy of the state
of A as if v received the (unique) message that has been sent to v′ by some of the
nodes w′ with P (w′) = w (each one using edge (w′, v′)).
Naturally, the last step assumes that some such neighbor sends a message and all w′ with
P (w′) send the same such message; otherwise, the simulation fails. We show that A′ can
be executed and simulates A provided that for each v ∈ V , no more than f of its copies
are in F ′.
Corollary 3. If for each v ∈ V , |{vi ∈ F ′}| ≤ f , A′ strongly simulates A.
Resilience of the Reinforcement. We now examine how large the probability p
can be for the precondition of Lemma 1 to be satisfied a.a.s.
Theorem 4. The above construction is a valid strong reinforcement for the fault model
Om(p) if p ∈ o(n−1/(f+1)). If G contains Ω(n) nodes with non-zero outdegree, p ∈
ω(n−1/(f+1)) implies that the reinforcement is not valid.
Proof. By Corollary 3, A′ strongly simulates A if for each v ∈ V , |{vi ∈ F ′}| ≤ f = `−1.
For v ∈ V , Pr [{vi | i ∈ [`]} ∩ F ′ = `] = pf+1. By a union bound, A′ thus simulates A
with probability 1− o(1) if p ∈ o(n−1/(f+1)).
Conversely, if there are Ω(n) nodes with non-zero outdegree and p ∈ ω(n−1/(f+1)), with
probability 1− o(1) all copies of at least one such node v are faulty. If v sends a message
under A, but all corresponding messages of copies of v are not sent, the simulation fails.
This shows that in this case the reinforcement is not valid.
2Nodes suffering omission failures still can simulate A correctly.
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Efficiency of the Reinforcement. For f ∈ N, we have that ν = ` = f + 1 and
η = `2 = f 2 + 2f + 1, while we can sustain p ∈ o(n−1/(f+1)). In the special case of f = 1,
we improve from p ∈ o(1/n) for the original network to p ∈ o(1/√n) by doubling the
number of nodes and quadrupling the number of edges.
6 More Efficient Reinforcement
In this section, we reduce the overhead in terms of edges at the expense of obtaining only
a (non-strong) reinforcement. We stress that the obtained trade-off between redundancy
(ν and η) and the sustainable probability of faults p is asymptotically optimal: as we
require to preserve arbitrary routing schemes in a blackbox fashion, we need sufficient
redundancy on the link level to directly simulate communication. From this observation,
both for Om(p) and Byz(p) we can readily derive trivial lower bounds on redundancy that
match the constructions below up to lower-order terms.
6.1 A Toy Example
Before we give the construction, we give some intuition on how we can reduce the number
of required edges. Consider the following simple case. G is a single path of n vertices
(v1, . . . , vn), and the schedule requires that in round i, a message is sent from vi to vi+1.
We would like to use a “budget” of only an additional n vertices and an additional
(1 + ε)m = (1 + ε)(n − 1) links, assuming the fault model Om(p). One approach is
to duplicate the path and extend the routing scheme accordingly. We already used our
entire budget apart from εm links! This reinforcement is valid as long as one of the
paths succeeds in delivering the message all the way. The probability that one of the
paths “survives” is 1 − (1 − (1 − p)n)2 ≤ 1 − (1 − e−pn)2 ≤ e−2pn, where we used that
1−x ≤ e−x for any x ∈ R. Hence, for any p = ω(1/n), the survival probability is o(1). In
contrast, the strong reinforcement with ` = 2 (i.e., f = 1) given in Section 5 sustains any
p ∈ o(1/√n) with probability 1 − o(1); however, while it adds n nodes only, it requires
3m additional edges.
We need to add some additional edges to avoid that the likelihood of the message
reaching its destination drops too quickly. To this end, we use the remaining εm edges to
“cross” between the two paths every h , 2/ε hops (assume h is an integer), c.f. Figure 1.
This splits the path into segments of h nodes each. As long as, for each such segment,
in one of its copies all nodes survive, the message is delivered. For a given segment, this
occurs with probability 1 − (1 − (1 − p)h)2 ≥ 1 − (ph)2. Overall, the message is thus
delivered with probability at least (1− (ph)2)n/h ≥ 1− nhp2. As for any constant ε, h is
a constant, this means that the message is delivered a.a.s. granted that p ∈ o(1/√n)!
6.2 Partitioning the Graph
To apply this strategy to other graphs, we must take into account that there can be
multiple intertwined routing paths. However, the key point in the above example was
not that we had path segments, but rather that we partitioned the nodes into constant-
size regions and used a few edges inside these regions only, while fully connecting the
copies of nodes at the boundary of the regions.
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Figure 1: On the right: a toy example. n = 9, m = 8, ε = 1/2, h = 4. The number of
additional edges is (1 + ε)m, instead of 3m as in the strong reinforcement construction.
On the left: a 6-ary 2-dimensional hypercube. The subdivision of the node set into 2-ary
2-dimensional subcubes is illustrated by dotted lines.
In general, it is not possible to partition the nodes into constant-sized subsets such
that only a very small fraction of the edges connects different subsets; any graph with
good expansion is a counter-example. Fortunately, many network topologies used in
practice are not expanders. We focus in this section on grid networks and minor free
graphs and show how to apply the above strategy in each of these families of graphs.
Grid Networks. We can generalize the above strategy to hypercubes of dimension
d > 1.
Definition 4 (Hypercube Networks). A q-ary d-dimensional hypercube has node set [q]d
and two nodes are adjacent if they agree on all but one index i ∈ [d], for which |vi−wi| = 1.
The proof of the following lemma is in Appendix C.
Lemma 5. For any h, d ∈ N, assume that h divides q ∈ N and set ε = 1/h. Then the
q-ary d-dimensional hypercube can be partitioned into (q/h)d regions of hd nodes such
that at most an ε-fraction of the edges connects nodes from different regions.
Note that the above result and proof extend to tori, which also include the “wrap-
around” edges connecting the first and last nodes in any given dimension.
Minor free Graphs. Another general class of graphs that can be partitioned in a
similar fashion are minor-free bounded-degree graph.
Definition 5 (H-Minor free Graphs). For a fixed graph H, H is a minor of G if H
is isomorphic to a graph that can be obtained by zero or more edge contractions on a
subgraph of G. We say that a graph G is H-minor free if H is not a minor of G.
For any such graph, we can apply a Corollary from [LR15, Coro. 2] which is based
on [AST90] to construct a suitable partition.
Theorem 6 ([LR15]). Let H be a fixed graph. There is a constant c(H) > 1 such
that for every ε ∈ (0, 1], every H-minor free graph G = (V,E) with degree bounded
by ∆ a partition R1, . . . , Rk ⊆ V with the following properties can be found in time
O(|V |3/2): (i) ∀i : |Ri| ≤ c(H)∆2ε2 , (ii) ∀i the subgraph induced by Ri in G is connected.
(iii) |{(u, v) | u ∈ Ri, v ∈ Rj, i 6= j}| ≤ ε · |V |.
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Remark 1. We remark that the grids and tori of dimension d > 2 are not minor-free.
We note that this construction is not satisfactory, as it involves large constants. It
demonstrates that a large class of graphs is amenable to the suggested approach, but it is
advisable to search for optimized constructions for specific graph families before applying
the scheme.
Reinforced Network G′ Equipped with a suitable partition of G = (V,E) into
disjoint regions R1, . . . , Rk ⊆ V , we reinforce as follows. As before, we set V ′ , V × [`],
denote vi , (v, i), define P (vi) , v, and set ` , f+1. However, the edge set of G′ differs.
For e = (v, w) ∈ E,
E ′e ,
{
{(vi, wi) | i ∈ [`]} if ∃k′ ∈ [k] : v, w ∈ Rk′
{(vi, wj) | i, j ∈ [`]} else.
and we set E ′ ,
⋃
e∈E E
′
e.
6.3 Simulation under Om(p)
Consider v ∈ V . We want to maintain the invariant that in each round, some vi has a
copy of the state of v in A. To this end, v′ ∈ V ′
(1) initializes local copies of all state variables of v as in A and sets know v′ = true;
(2) sends on each link (v′, w′) ∈ E ′ in each round
• the message P (v′) would send on (P (v′), P (w′)) when executing A if know v′ =
true and P (v′) would send a message,
• a special symbol ⊥ if know v′ = true and v would not send a message on
(P (v′), P (w′)) when executing A, or
• no message if know v′ = false;
(3) if, in a given round, know v′ = true and v
′ receives for each neighbor w of P (v′) a
message from some wj ∈ V ′, it updates the local copy of the state of v in A as if
P (v′) received this message (interpreting ⊥ as no message); and
(4) if this is not the case, v′ sets know v′ = false.
We claim that as long as know v′ = true at v
′, v′ has indeed a copy of the state of P (v′)
in the corresponding execution of A; therefore, it can send the right messages and update
its state variables correctly.
Lemma 7. Suppose that for each k′ ∈ [k], there is some i ∈ [`] so that {vi | v ∈ Rk′}∩F ′ =
∅. Then A′ simulates A.
Proof. Select for each Rk′ , k
′ ∈ [k], some i such that {vi | v ∈ Rk′} ∩ F ′ = ∅ and denote
by C the union of all these nodes. As P (C) = V , it suffices to show that each v′ ∈ C
successfully maintains a copy of the state of P (v′) under A. However, we also need to
make sure that each sent message is “correct,” in the sense that a message sent over
edge (v′, w′) ∈ E ′ in round r would be sent by A over (P (v′), P (w′)) (where ⊥ means no
message is sent). Therefore, we will argue that the set of nodes Tr , {v′ ∈ V ′ | know v′ =
true in round r} knows the state of their counterpart P (v′) under A up to and including
round r ∈ N. As nodes v′ with know v′ = false do not send any messages, this invariant
guarantees that all sent messages are correct in the above sense.
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We now show by induction on the round number r ∈ N that (i) each v′ ∈ Tr knows
the state of P (v′) under A and (ii) C ⊆ Tr. Due to initialization, this is correct initially,
i.e., in “round 0;” we use this to anchor the induction at r = 0, setting T0 , V ′.
For the step from r to r + 1, note that because all v′ ∈ Tr have a copy of the state
of P (v′) at the end of round r by the induction hypothesis, each of them can correctly
determine the message P (v′) would send over link (v, w) ∈ E in round r + 1 and send
it over each (v′, w′) ∈ E ′ with P (w′) = w. Recall that v′ ∈ Tr+1 if and only if v′ ∈ Tr
and for each (w,P (v′)) ∈ E there is at least one w′ ∈ V ′ with P (w′) = w from which v′
receives a message. Since under Om(p) nodes in F ′ may only omit sending messages, it
follows that v′ ∈ Tr+1 correctly updates the state variables of P (v′), just as P (v′) would
in round r + 1 of A.
It remains to show that C ⊆ Tr+1. Consider vi ∈ C and (w, v) ∈ E. If v, w ∈ Rk′
for some k′ ∈ [k], then wi ∈ C by definition of C. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
wi ∈ Tr, and wi will send the message w would send in round r + 1 of A over (w, v) ∈ E
to vi, using the edge (wi, vi) ∈ E ′. If this is not the case, then there is some j ∈ [`] such
that wj ∈ C and we have that (wj, vi) ∈ E ′. Again, vi will receive the message w would
send in round r + 1 of A from wj. We conclude that vi receives at least one copy of
the message from w for each (w, v) ∈ E, implying that v ∈ Tr+1 as claimed. Thus, the
induction step succeeds and the proof is complete.
Resilience of the Reinforcement. Denote R , maxk′∈[k]{|Rk′|} and r ,
mink′∈[k]{|Rk′ |}.
Theorem 8. The above construction is a valid reinforcement for the fault model Om(p)
if p ∈ o((n/r)−1/(f+1)/R). Moreover, if G contains Ω(n) nodes with non-zero outdegree
and R ∈ O(1), p ∈ ω(n−1/(f+1)) implies that the reinforcement is not valid.
Proof. By Lemma 7, A′ simulates A if for each k′ ∈ [k], there is some i ∈ [`] so that
{vi | v ∈ Rk′}∩F ′ = ∅. For fixed k′ and i ∈ [`], Pr [{vi | v ∈ Rk′} ∩ F ′ = ∅] = (1−p)|Rk′ | ≥
1 − Rp. Accordingly, the probability that for a given k′ the precondition of the lemma
is violated is at most (Rp)f+1. As k ≤ n/r, taking a union bound over all k′ yields that
with probability at least 1− n/r · (Rp)f+1, A′ simulates A. Therefore, the reinforcement
is valid if p ∈ o((n/r)−1/(f+1)/R).
Now assume that r ≤ R ∈ O(1) and that p ∈ ω(n−1/(f+1)) = ω((n/r)−1/(f+1)/R).
Thus, for each v ∈ V , all v′ ∈ V ′ with P (v′) = v simultaneously end up in F ′ with
probability ω(1/n). Therefore, if Ω(n) nodes have non-zero outdegree, with a probability
in 1 − (1 − ω(1/n))Ω(n) = 1 − o(1) for at least one such node v all its copies end up in
F ′.3 In this case, the simulation fails if v sends a message under A, but all copies of v′
suffer omission failures in the respective round.
Efficiency of the Reinforcement. For f ∈ N, we have that ν = ` = f + 1 and
η = (1 − ε)` + ε`2 = 1 + (1 + ε)f + εf 2, while we can sustain p ∈ o(n−1/(f+1)). In the
special case of f = 1 and ε = 1/5, we improve from p ∈ o(1/n) for the original network
to p ∈ o(1/√n) by doubling the number of nodes and multiplying the number of edges
by 2.4.
3We slightly abuse notation, as ω(1/n) could mean values larger than 1; however, as this term
represents a probability, it can be at most 1.
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We remark that in the case of hypercubes and tori, the asymptotic notation for p does
not hide huge constants. Using Lemma 5, we see that h enters the threshold Theorem 8
provides as h−d+1/2; as the cases of d = 2 and d = 3 are the most typical (grids and tori of
higher dimension suffer from large distortion when embedding them into 3-dimensional
space), the threshold on p degrades by factors of 11.2 and 55.9, respectively.
6.4 Simulation under Byz(p)
The same strategy can be applied for the stronger fault model Byz(p), if we switch back
to having ` = 2f+1 copies and nodes accepting the majority message among all messages
from copies of a neighbor in the original graph.
Consider node v ∈ V . We want to maintain the invariant that in each round, a
majority among the nodes vi, i ∈ [`], has a copy of the state of v in A. For v′ ∈ V ′ and
(w,P (v′)) ∈ E, set Nv′(w) , {w′ ∈ V ′ | (w′, v′) ∈ E ′}. With this notation, v′ behaves as
follows.
(1) It initializes local copies of all state variables of v as in A.
(2) It sends in each round on each link (v′, w′) ∈ E ′ the message v would send on
(P (v′), P (w′)) when executing A (if v′ cannot compute this correctly, it may send an
arbitrary message).
(3) It updates its state in round r as if it received, for each (w,P (v′)) ∈ E, the message
the majority of nodes in Nv′(w) sent.
The proof of the following lemma is in Appendix C.
Lemma 9. Suppose that for each k′ ∈ [k], there are at least f + 1 indices i ∈ [`] so that
{vi | v ∈ Rk′} ∩ F ′ = ∅. Then A′ simulates A.
Resilience of the Reinforcement. Denote R , maxk′∈[k]{|Rk′ |} and r ,
mink′∈[k]{|Rk′ |}.
Theorem 10. Assume that Rp ∈ o(1). The above construction is a valid reinforcement
for the fault model Byz(p) if p ∈ o((n/r)−1/(f+1)/R). Moreover, if G contains Ω(n) nodes
with non-zero outdegree and R ∈ O(1), p ∈ ω(n−1/(f+1)) implies that the reinforcement is
not valid.
Proof. By Lemma 9, A′ simulates A if for each k′ ∈ [k], there are at least f + 1 indices
i ∈ [`] so that {vi | v ∈ Rk′}∩F ′ = ∅. For fixed k′ and i ∈ [`], Pr [{vi | v ∈ Rk′} ∩ F ′ = ∅] =
(1 − p)|Rk′ | ≥ 1 − Rp. Thus, analogous to the proof of Theorem 2, the probability that
for a given k′ the condition is violated is at most
∑2f+1
j=f+1
(
2f+1
j
)
(Rp)j(1 − Rp)2f+1−j ∈
(2e)f (Rp)f+1(1 + o(1)). By a union bound over the at most n/r regions, we see that
p ∈ o((n/r)−1/(f+1)/R) thus guarantees that the simulation succeeds a.a.s.
As r ≤ R ∈ O(1), the proof of the second statement is analogous to the respective
statement of Theorem 2.
Efficiency of the Reinforcement. For f ∈ N, we have that ν = ` = 2f + 1 and
η = (1− ε)` + ε`2 = 1 + (2 + 2ε)f + 4εf 2, while we can sustain p ∈ o(n−1/(f+1)). In the
special case of f = 1 and ε = 1/5, we improve from p ∈ o(1/n) for the original network
to p ∈ o(1/√n) by tripling the number of nodes and multiplying the number of edges
by 4.2.
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7 Discussion
In the previous sections, we have established that constant-factor redundancy can sig-
nificantly increase reliability of the communication network in a blackbox fashion. Our
constructions in Section 6 are close to optimal. Thus, one may argue that the costs are
too high. However, apart from arguing that the costs of using sufficiently reliable compo-
nents may be even higher, we would like to raise a number of additional points in favor
of the approach.
Node Redundancy. When building a reliable large-scale system, fault-tolerance
needs to be considered on all system levels. Unless nodes are sufficiently reliable, node
replication is mandatory, regardless of the communication network. In other words, the
node redundancy required by our construction may not be an actual overhead to begin
with. When taking this point of view, the salient question becomes whether the increase
in links is acceptable. Here, the first observation is that any system employing node
redundancy will need to handle the arising additional communication, incurring the re-
spective burden on the communication network. Apart from still having to handle the
additional traffic, however, the system designer now needs to make sure that the network
is sufficiently reliable for the node redundancy to matter. Our simple schemes then simply
provide a means to provide the necessary communication infrastructure without running
the risk of introducing, e.g., a single point of failure during the design of the communi-
cation network; at the same time, the design process is simplified and modularized.
Dynamic Faults. Due to the introduced fault-tolerance, faulty components do not
impede the system as a whole, so long as the simulation of the routing scheme (and the
actual computations by the nodes) can still be carried out. Hence, one may repair faulty
nodes at runtime. If T is the time for detecting and fixing a fault, we can discretize time
in units of T and denote by pT the (assumed to be independent) probability that a node
is faulty in a given time slot, which can be bounded by twice the probability to fail within
T time. Then the failure probabilities we computed in our analysis directly translate to
an upper bound on the expected fraction of time during which the system is not (fully)
operational.
Adaptivity. The employed node- and link-level redundancy may be required for
mission-critical applications only, or the system may run into capacity issues. In this case,
we can exploit that the reinforced network has a very simple structure, making various
adaptive strategies straightforward to implement. (i) One may simply use a subnetwork
only, deactivating the remaining nodes and links, such that a reinforced network for
smaller f (or a copy of the original network, if f = 0) remains. This saves energy.
(ii) One may subdivide the network into several smaller reinforced networks, each of
which can perform different tasks. (iii) One may leverage the redundant links to increase
the overall bandwidth between (copies of) nodes, at the expense of reliability. (iv) The
above operations can be applied locally; e.g., in a congested region of the network, the
link redundancy could be used for additional bandwidth. Note that if only a small part of
the network is congested, the overall system reliability will not deteriorate significantly.
Note that the above strategies can be refined and combined according to the profile of
requirements of the system.
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8 Conclusion
In this work we analyze simple replication strategies for improving network reliability.
While our basic schemes may hardly surprise, to the best of our knowledge the literature
does not provide the kind of discussion given here. This, in turn, surprised us: simplicity
is an important design feature, and we tried to convey the message that a number of
significant advantages in overall system design arise from the proposed approach. In
addition, we highlight that (still simple) refined strategy results in near-optimal trade-offs
under the constraint that arbitrary routing schemes are fully preserved. We consider this
property highly useful in general and essential in real-time systems. Weaker guarantees
may result in more efficient solutions, but also necessitate that other system levels must
be able to handle the consequences.
Our work raises a number of follow-up questions. (i) Which network topologies allow
for good partitions as utilized in Section 6? Small constants here result in highly efficient
reinforcement schemes, which is key to practical solutions. (ii) Is it possible to guarantee
strong simulations at smaller overheads? (iii) Can constructions akin to the one given in
Section 6 be applied to a larger class of graphs?
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A Other Related Work
In the area of Fault-Tolerant Logical Network Structures, the goal is to compute a sub-
network that has a predefined property, e.g., containing minimum spanning tree. More
specifically, the sub-network should sustain adversarial omission faults without losing
the property. Hence, the sub-network is usually augmented (with edges) from the input
network in comparison to its corresponding non-fault-tolerant counterpart. Naturally, an
additional goal is to compute a small such sub-network. In contrast, we design a network
that is reinforced (or augmented) by additional edges and nodes so that a given routing
scheme can be simulated while facing randomized Byzantine faults. As we ask for being
able to “reproduce” an arbitrary routing scheme (in the sense of a simulation relation),
we cannot rely on a sub-network.
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The literature also considered random fault models. In the network reliability prob-
lem, the goal is to compute the probability that the (connected) input network becomes
disconnected under random independent edge failures. The reliability of a network is the
probability that the network remains connected after this random process. Karger [Kar01]
gave a fully polynomial randomized approximation scheme for the network reliability
problem. Chechik et. al [CEPSP12] studied a variant of the task, in which the goal is
to compute a sparse sub-network that approximates the reliability of the input network.
We, on the other hand, construct a reinforced network that increases the reliability of the
input network; note also that our requirements are much stricter than merely preserving
connectivity. For a more detailed survey on Fault-Tolerant Logical Network Structures,
see [P.16].
Compact self-healing routing schemes were studied by Castan˜eda et. al [CDT16]. In
this context, the term “compact” means that each node’s storage is limited to o(n). In
the self-healing model, the adversary removes nodes in an online fashion, one node in
each time step (at most n such steps). In turn, the distributed algorithm adds links and
sends at most O(∆) additional messages to overcome the inflicted omission fault. A nice
property of this algorithm is that the degrees are increased by at most 3. For our purposes,
an issue is that the diameter is increased by a logarithmic factor of the maximum initial
degree, and hence the same holds for the latency of the routing scheme. Instead, we
design a network that is “oblivious” to faults in the sense that the network is “ready”
for independent random faults up to a certain probability, without the need to reroute
messages or any other reconfiguration. Moreover, our reinforcements tolerate Byzantine
faults and work for arbitrary routing schemes. We remark that compact self-healing
routing schemes also deal with the update time of the local data structures following the
deletion of a node; no such update is required in our approach.
Kuhn et. al [KSW10] study faults in peer-to-peer systems in which an adversary adds
and removes nodes from the network within a short period of time (this process is also
called churn). In this setting, the goal is to maintain functionality of the network in
spite of this adversarial process. Kuhn et. al [KSW10] considered hypercube and pancake
topologies, with a powerful adversary that cannot be “fooled” by randomness. However,
it is limited to at most O(∆) nodes which it can add or remove within any constant
amount of time. The main idea in [KSW10] is to maintain a balanced partition of the
nodes, where each part plays the role of a supernode in the network topology. This is done
by rebalancing the nodes after several adversarial acts, and increasing the dimensionality
of the hypercube in case the parts become too big. In section 6, we study hypercube
networks as well as minor-free networks. We employ two partitioning techniques to make
sure that: (1) the size of each part is constant and (2) the number of links in the cut
between the parts is at most ε · n, where n is the number of nodes. These partitioning
techniques help us to dial down the overheads within each part, and to avoid a failure
of each part due to its small size. However, we note that our motivation for considering
these topologies is that they are used as communication topologies, for which we can
provide good reinforcements, rather than choosing them to exploit their structure for
constructing efficient and/or reliable routing schemes.
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B Practical View on Other Performance Measures
We briefly discuss, from a practical point of view, why we do not explicitly consider
further metrics that are of interest.
• Latency. As our reinforcements require (time-preserving) simulation relations, in
terms of rounds, there is no increase in latency whatsoever. However, we note that
(i) we require all copies of a node to have access to the input (i.e., routing requests)
of the simulated node and (ii) our simulations require to map received messages in
G′ to received messages of the simulated node in G. Regarding (i), recall that it is
beneficial to place all copies of a node in physical vicinity, implying that the induced
additional latency is small. Moreover, our constructions naturally lend themselves
to support redundancy in computations as well, by having each copy of a node
perform the tasks of its original; in this case, (i) comes for free. Concerning (ii),
we remark that the respective operations are extremely simple; implementing them
directly in hardware is straightforward and will have limited impact on latency in
most systems.
• Bandwidth/link capacities. We consider the uniform setting in this work. Taking
into account how our simulations operate, one may use the ratio η as a proxy for
this value.
• Energy consumption. Regarding the energy consumption of links, the same ap-
plies as for bandwidth. The energy nodes use for routing computations is the
same as in the original system, except for the overhead induced by Point (ii) we
discussed for latency. Neglecting the latter, the energy overhead is in the range
[min{ν, η},max{ν, η}].
• Hardware cost. Again, neglecting the computational overhead of the simulation,
the relative overhead lies in the range [min{ν, η},max{ν, η}]
In light of these considerations, we focus on p, ν, and η as key metrics for evaluating the
performance of our reinforcement strategies.
C Omitted Proofs
C.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We subdivide the node set into h-ary d-dimensional subcubes. There are (q/h)d
such subcubes. The edges crossing the regions are those connecting the faces of adjacent
subcubes. For each subcube, we attribute for each dimension one face to each subcube
(the opposite face being accounted for by the adjacent subcube in that direction). Thus,
we have at most dhd−1 crossing edges per subcube. The total number of edges per
subcube are these crossing edges plus the d(h−1)hd−1 edges within the subcube. Overall,
the fraction of crossedges is thus at most 1/(1 + (h − 1)) = 1/h, as claimed (for an
example of the subdivision of the node set of a 6-ary 2-dimensional hypercube into 2-ary
2-dimensional subcubes see Figure 1).
C.2 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. Select for each Rk′ , k
′ ∈ [k], f + 1 indices i such that {vi | v ∈ Rk′} ∩ F ′ = ∅
and denote by C the union of all these nodes. We claim that each v′ ∈ C successfully
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maintains a copy of the state of P (v′) under A. We show this by induction on the round
number r ∈ N, anchored at r = 0 due to initialization.
For the step from r to r + 1, observe that because all v′ ∈ C have a copy of the state
of P (v′) at the end of round r by the induction hypothesis, each of them can correctly
determine the message P (v′) would send over link (v, w) ∈ E in round r + 1 and send
it over each (v′, w′) ∈ E with P (w′) = w. For each v′ ∈ C and each (w,P (v′)), we
distinguish two cases. If P (v′) and w are in the same region, let i be such that v′ = vi. In
this case, Nv′ = {wi} and, by definition of C, wi ∈ C. Thus, by the induction hypothesis,
wi sends the correct message in round r + 1 over the link (w
′, v′). On the other hand, if
P (v′) and w are in different regions, Nv′(w) = {wi | i ∈ [`]}. By the definition of C and
the induction hypothesis, the majority of these nodes (i.e., at least f + 1 of them) sends
the correct message w would send over (w,P (v′)) in round r + 1 when executing A. We
conclude that v′ correctly updates its state, completing the proof.
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